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THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR
REGULATING CONFLICT OIL AND GAS SOURCED
FROM THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
JAMIE HUFFMAN*
INTRODUCTION
The South China Sea is one of, if not the most, contested territories
in the world,1 with China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Taiwan,
and the Philippines all advancing contradictory claims to the Sea.2 Up to
$5 trillion in trade passes through the region each year,3 and it is thought
to contain significant hydrocarbon reserves,4 both of which have helped to
fuel continued controversy over control of the Sea. This is due to the fact
that China claims roughly ninety percent of the region, an area that the
government refers to as the “nine-dash line,” although this “line” is not
recognized by international law.5 While, as aforementioned,6 numerous
countries have laid claim to the South China Sea, in 2013 the Philippines
unilaterally initiated an arbitration under the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) against China at the Hague, the lat-
ter of which refused to participate in the proceedings.7 Ultimately, one
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2018; BA, Global Studies & Political
Science, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2014.
1 Peter Greste et al., ‘Misunderstanding’ may lead to conflict between US and China over
South China Sea, expert warns, ABC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2016), http://www.abc.net.au/news
/2016-10-03/south-china-sea-us-china-misunderstandings-may-cause-conflict/7893012
[https://perma.cc/28VE-YFZV].
2 Tiffany M. Lin, Chinese Attitudes Toward Third-Party Dispute Resolution in Interna-
tional Law, 48 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 581, 599 (2016).
3 Rosalind Mathieson, Singapore Worried Most About Fishermen and Coast Guards in
South China Sea, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles
/2016-10-02/fishermen-coast-guards-worry-singapore-most-in-south-china-sea [https://
perma.cc/4G5A-H7DR]; David Tweed, Territorial Disputes, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 20, 2017),
https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/territorial-disputes [https://perma.cc/L8R6-C5AR].
4 Full unclosure?, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 24, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/2155
1113 [https://perma.cc/5RT6-4396].
5 Tom Phillips et al., Beijing rejects tribunal’s ruling in South China Sea case, THE GUARD-
IAN (July 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/12/philippines-wins-south
-china-sea-case-against-china [https://perma.cc/6RUB-J88F].
6 See Lin, supra note 2.
7 TRAN TRUONG THUY & LE THUY TRANG, POWER, LAW, AND MARITIME ORDER IN THE
SOUTH CHINA SEA 5 (2015); Phillips et al., supra note 5.
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of the major issues that factored into the Hague Tribunal’s decision was
the environmental degradation caused by the Chinese government.8
In addition to its geopolitical importance, the South China Sea is
also significant both environmentally and ecologically. The reefs in the
South China Sea are considered to be “some of the most biodiverse on
Earth,” and approximately ten percent of the entire reef (more than “60
square miles”) has been destroyed throughout the conflict.9 These reefs
also contain significant portions of the earth’s coral- and reef-fish species,
seventy-six percent and thirty-seven percent respectively.10 China, in an
attempt to better assert its sovereignty and control over the Sea, has con-
ducted island-building processes in the Spratly Islands, including dredg-
ing and covering existing reefs with sand to create new landmasses.11
Nonetheless, the Chinese government asserts that this island building
only constitutes “minimal, recoverable damage.”12 Additionally, illegal
poaching of endangered giant clams was allowed—and even encouraged—
for a time by the Chinese government, further compounding the environ-
mental destruction in the Sea.13
As was previously mentioned, much of the Hague Tribunal’s de-
cision centered around environmental destruction in the Sea that was
directly encouraged or tacitly authorized by the Chinese government.14
The Tribunal found that China did not have any historical rights to the
majority of the South China Sea, as the Chinese government has often
8 Jackie Northam, One Result of China’s Buildup in South China Sea: Environmental
Havoc, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Sept. 1, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/09/01
/491395715/one-result-of-chinas-buildup-in-south-china-sea-environmental-havoc [https://
web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/09/01/491395715/one
-result-of-chinas-buildup-in-south-china-sea-environmental-havoc].
9 Rachel Bale, Critical Reefs Destroyed in Poachers’ Quest for World’s Biggest Clams, Nat’l
Geographic (Aug. 30, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/wildlife-giant
-clam-poaching-south-china-sea-destruction/ [https://perma.cc/3WMS-B8WN].
10 Akshat Rathi, The most ignored aspect of the South China Sea brawl might be the key
to solving it, QUARTZ (July 26, 2016), https://qz.com/741989/the-most-ignored-aspect-of
-the-south-china-sea-brawl-might-be-the-key-to-solving-it/ [https://perma.cc/6V4Q-GBXT].
11 Bale, supra note 9.
12 Johnny Langenheim, Preventing Ecocide in South China Sea, THE GUARDIAN (July 15,
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/the-coral-triangle/2015/jul/15/prevent
ing-ecocide-in-south-china-sea [https://perma.cc/2SRG-PWEA].
13 See Bale, supra note 9 (coastal waters over fished so fishermen turned to the illegal
giant clam market in the South China Sea for supplemental income) (“The government
helped [these fishermen] out with a special fuel subsidy to travel . . . [t]o the Spratly
Islands.”).
14 See id.; Hannah Beech, The Environment Is the Silent Casualty of Beijing’s Ambitions
in the South China Sea, TIME (May 31, 2016), http://time.com/4353292/south-china-sea
-environment-destruction-coral-giant-clams/ [https://perma.cc/96PQ-8VLP].
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claimed.15 Further, the Tribunal also found that “China had violated in-
ternational law by causing ‘irreparable harm’ to the marine environment,
endangering Philippine ships and interfering with Philippine fishing and
oil exploration.”16 Thus, even though China did not actually participate
in the arbitration, many of the claims it had previously made publicly
were still struck down by the Hague Tribunal.17
Nonetheless, China’s reaction to the Tribunal’s ruling was less than
favorable. Xi Jinping, the president of China, stated that his country’s “ ‘ter-
ritorial sovereignty and marine rights’ ” to the South China Sea would
remain unaltered by the Tribunal’s decision, stating that his country was
“‘committed to resolving disputes’ ” with neighboring countries.18 Further,
Xinhua, the country’s official news agency, hit out at what
it described as an “ill-founded” ruling that was “naturally
null and void.” The Communist party mouthpiece newspa-
per the People’s Daily said in an editorial that the tribunal
had ignored “basic truths” and “trampled” on international
laws and norms. “The Chinese government and the Chi-
nese people firmly oppose [the ruling] and will neither
acknowledge it nor accept it,” it added.19
Thus, the Chinese government has made it abundantly clear that it will
not comply with the Tribunal’s ruling and does not consider it to be in
any way binding.
Nonetheless, the Hague’s decision is technically binding, although
it is not actually enforceable in practice.20 Further, even though China
has ratified UNCLOS,21 under which the arbitration was initiated, China
15 Jane Perlez, Tribunal Rejects Beijing’s Claims in South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES (July 12,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-phil
ippines.html?_r=0 [https://web.archive.org/web/*/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13
/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.html?_r=0].
16 Id.
17 Phillips et al., supra note 5.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Euan Graham, The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or
Slow-Burning Influence?, COUNCIL OF COUNCILS (Aug. 18, 2016), http://www.cfr.org/coun
cilofcouncils/global_memos/p38227 [https://perma.cc/6YLN-THBT]; Brian McGarry, En-
forcing an Unenforceable Ruling in the South China Sea, THE DIPLOMAT (July 16, 2016),
http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/enforcing-an-unenforceable-ruling-in-the-south-china-sea/
[https://perma.cc/AA8U-GQU2]; Perlez, supra note 15.
21 Perlez, supra note 15.
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included a reservation after ratification stating that it would not submit
to the mandatory dispute settlement provided for under the treaty.22
However, the Philippines still has other mechanisms by which to
pressure China into compliance with the decision, particularly as per-
tains to environmental harm. Specifically, the Philippines should con-
sider collaboration with other governments and private industry in the
creation of an international certification scheme for any oil or gas that
China may attempt to extract from the South China Sea, much like the
schemes that have been employed to regulate trade in conflict diamonds
and other natural resources.23 The rights to the hydrocarbons24 in the
South China Sea were granted to the Philippines by the Hague Tribunal,
yet China nonetheless still claims sovereignty over the regions that hold
these hydrocarbon reserves.25 Thus, this Note argues that one of the
alternative means by which to enforce the substance of the Tribunal’s de-
cision is to create a certification scheme for oil and gas from the South
China Sea. This would effectively ensure that any hydrocarbons that are
sourced from the region are not extracted illegally, i.e., by the Chinese
government in waters outside of their sovereign control. The creation of
such a certification scheme could thus incentivize China to avoid violation
of the Tribunal’s ruling in the first place by refraining from exploring and
extracting oil and gas from the Sea. Or, alternatively, a certification
scheme could act as a form of punishment if China does conduct drilling,
in that Chinese companies would effectively be unable to bring any of the
oil and gas that they extract to the international market.
This type of solution is particularly useful considering the fact
that the Philippines is currently presented with a natural resource curse,
in that its valuable natural resources—here, the hydrocarbons—have in
fact exacerbated the larger conflict over the territory in the South China
Sea. This conflict is fueled by the valuable nature of the hydrocarbon
22 Graham, supra note 20.
23 See generally FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., The broad range of certification schemes,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/010/ai388e/AI388E09.htm [https://perma.cc/A5AR-T7SE] (last
visited Nov. 12, 2017); KIMBERLEY PROCESS, About, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com
/en/about [https://perma.cc/4SSQ-5ZKB] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
24 Hydrocarbons are “organic chemical compound[s]” of which oil and gas are predomi-
nantly constructed. INVESTOPEDIA, Hydrocarbon, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h
/hydrocarbon.asp [https://perma.cc/V53B-K76T] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
25 Despite Legal Victory in South China Sea, Philippines’ Oil Remains in Troubled
Waters, FORTUNE (July 21, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/07/22/despite-legal-victory-in
-south-china-sea-philippines-oil-remains-in-troubled-waters/ [https://perma.cc/V7SA-A3GS]
[hereinafter Despite Legal Victory in South China Sea].
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reserves, particularly for China, which has experienced significant growth
and industrialization in recent decades.26 Additionally, the Philippines
will be in dire need of alternative domestic fuel sources in the coming
decade due to an impending domestic oil shortage.27 Thus, the Philippines
can effectively deter China from drilling for these hydrocarbon reserves
(or, alternatively, retaliate against any illegal Chinese drilling) by coor-
dinating with other national governments as well as private actors in a
certification scheme to ensure that any oil or gas that is sourced from the
region in dispute does not go to market.
A variety of effective certification schemes already exists for goods
from areas in conflict.28 Specifically, the Kimberley Process Certification
Scheme (“the Kimberley Process”), which regulates trade in conflict dia-
monds, can provide a useful model for a certification framework for any
oil and gas extracted from the South China Sea.29 By relying on an al-
ready established framework, the Philippines’ partners in other national
governments and private industry will be more likely to accept a new
certification scheme as it is based on a tried and tested method. An
additional benefit of relying on an already established framework is also
that the Kimberley Process has been in existence for long enough that its
flaws have become apparent and can be accounted for in establishing a
new scheme for hydrocarbons from the Sea.30
First, this Note will generally discuss the relevant background
information on the dispute, as well as the details of the Hague Tribunal’s
decision and how this relates to the rights to the hydrocarbon reserves
in the Sea. It will then discuss the concept of resource curses generally, as
well as how this theory is applicable to the conflict over these hydrocarbon
reserves. This will then be followed by an introduction to natural resource
certification schemes, as well as a discussion of the Kimberley Process,
both in general and also as a model for alleviating natural resource curses.
Subsequently, this Note will discuss the means by which a new certification
26 WORLD BANK, GDP (current US$), http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP
.CD?locations=CN [https://perma.cc/5JRQ-MQFA] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017); WORLD
BANK, Population, total, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN
[https://perma.cc/9GNA-TT9H] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
27 Despite Legal Victory in South China Sea, supra note 25.
28 See, e.g., FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N., supra note 23 (examples include the “Organic
Farming—EC Control System” in the European Union, the Agriculture Biologique logo
in France, and the Organic Foods Production Act in the United States).
29 KIMBERLEY PROCESS, supra note 23.
30 Id. (negotiations began in 2002, entered force in 2003, and changes made in 2010, 2011,
and 2013).
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scheme could be tailor-made for oil and gas from the South China Sea by
accounting for the inherent weaknesses in the Kimberley Process.
I. HISTORY OF THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTE
The waters of the South China Sea, as well as the hydrocarbons,
reefs, and other maritime features contained therein, have been em-
broiled in conflict for decades.31 Multiple Asian countries lay claim to the
Sea and its various features—most significantly for the purposes of this
discussion, China and the Philippines.32 Each year up to $5 trillion in
trade passes through the Sea, making the region of high importance not
only in Asia, but also to trading partners around the world.33 China
claims the vast majority of the territory within the South China Sea, at
around roughly ninety percent of the region.34 The Chinese government
describes this area as being within the “nine-dash line,”35 in reference to
a line drawn on maps from the 1940s and from which China draws its
claims of ownership and sovereignty over the Sea.36 The nine-dash line,
however, has “no basis in international law.”37
One of the major controversies surrounding the South China Sea
concerns what is thought to be significant hydrocarbon resources under-
neath the Sea.38 Exploration in the Sea has been minimal to this point
and estimates vary as to how much of these hydrocarbons may actually
exist.39 Further, it is believed that much of these hydrocarbon reserves
are in fact natural gas (roughly sixty to seventy percent, according to
some estimates), rather than oil.40 It is also important, for the purposes
31 BBC NEWS, Why is the South China Sea Contentious? (July 12, 2016), http://www.bbc
.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349 [https://perma.cc/2EDA-GTUT].
32 Lin, supra note 2; Greste et al., supra note 1.
33 Mathieson, supra note 3; Tweed, supra note 3.
34 Phillips et al., supra note 5.
35 Greste et al., supra note 1.
36 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 4.
37 Id.
38 See generally The South China Sea Arbitration Award of 12 July 2016, In the Matter
of the South China Sea Arbitration (Perm. Ct. Arb. July 12, 2016) (No. 2013-19) [here-
inafter South China Sea Arbitration Award].
39 Jeremy Maxie, The South China Sea Dispute Isn’t About Oil, At Least Not How You
Think, FORBES (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremymaxie/2016/04/25/the
-south-china-sea-dispute-isnt-about-oil-at-least-not-how-you-think/#6875d84a7275
[http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeremymaxie/2016/04/25/the
-south-china-sea-dispute-isnt-about-oil-at-least-not-how-you-think/#6875d84a7275].
40 Tim Daiss, Why The South China Sea Has More Oil Than You Think, FORBES (May 22,
2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/timdaiss/2016/05/22/why-the-south-china-sea-has-more
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of this discussion, to distinguish between hydrocarbon reserves and re-
sources. Hydrocarbon reserves are defined as
oil or gas assets remaining in place that are fairly well
known, and have been discovered by exploratory drilling.
Reserves must also be extractable at a net profit at mar-
ket prices with current technology . . . Resources on the
other hand are deposits that do not meet one or more of
the criteria for reserves.41
Thus, while the Sea has both reserves and resources, the fact that the
Sea likely contains significant reserves is of crucial importance, as it is
actually possible to extract reserves at a profit in the near future.42
The China National Offshore Oil Company, which is owned by the
Chinese government, has estimated that the South China Sea has roughly
“125 billion barrels of oil and 500 trillion cubic feet of gas in undiscovered
areas”; however, this has not been independently confirmed.43 A USGS
study from 2010, nonetheless, found that “there is a ninety-five percent
chance that there is [sic] at least 750 million barrels of oil in the South
China Sea Platform, a median chance of around 2,000 million barrels,
and a low probability (5%) of over 5,000 million barrels.”44 Thus, while it
is difficult to definitively ascertain just how much oil and gas lies beneath
the sea without conducting further exploration, the fact remains that all
estimates indicate that there are significant hydrocarbon reserves under
the Sea. Therefore, because the South China Sea has “over 500 million
barrels of oil,” it is considered “one of the world’s major oil fields.”45
The Philippine government has attempted to license and contract
with private industry in order to conduct further exploration for oil and
-oil-than-you-think/#4215abc13a3f [http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://www.forbes.com
/sites/timdaiss/2016/05/22/why-the-south-china-sea-has-more-oil-than-you-think
/#4215abc13a3f].
41 Id.
42 Jude Clemente, U.S. Oil Reserves, Resources, and Unlimited Future Supply, FORBES
(Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2015/04/02/u-s-oil-reserves-re
sources-and-unlimited-future-supply/#3dc398f857e1 [http://web.archive.org/web/*/https://
www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2015/04/02/u-s-oil-reserves-resources-and-unlimited
-future-supply/#3dc398f857e1]. See also Reserves Definitions, SOC’Y OF PETROLEUM EN’RS,
http://petrowiki.org/Reserves_definitions [https://perma.cc/2F3F-46J7] (last visited Nov. 12,
2017).
43 Daiss, supra note 40.
44 Id.
45 Id.
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gas within the Sea,46 but has been met with strong opposition from the
Chinese government, which continues to assert their “indisputable sover-
eignty”47 in the region. The Philippines argued to the Hague Tribunal
that “China’s interference with oil and gas exploration and exploitation,
and the measures adopted to prevent fishing in the Philippines’ EEZ
[Exclusive Economic Zone] and continental shelf, constitute . . . continu-
ing violations of . . . Articles 56, 58, 61, 62, 73, 77 and 81” of UNCLOS,
causing this issue to become a major part of the Tribunal decision.48
II. THE HAGUE TRIBUNAL DECISION
The Chinese government has repeatedly repudiated the Hague
Tribunal proceedings and contested its jurisdiction.49 Further, in 2006,
China made a declaration that stated, “the Government of the People’s
Republic of China does not accept any of the procedures provided for in
Section 2 of Part XV of the Convention with respect to all the categories
of disputes referred to in paragraph 1(a) (b) and (c) of Article 298 of the
Convention.”50 This means that, essentially, China has formally taken all
of the exceptions that they possibly can under UNCLOS, therefore the
scope of their obligations and responsibilities under UNCLOS are as
minimal as they can possibly be while the country still remains a party.51
The Declaration stated that China “revoked the jurisdiction of the Tribu-
nal over disputes regarding maritime boundaries, historic titles and mili-
tary activities,” which the Chinese government has argued deprives the
Hague Tribunal of jurisdiction.52
Nonetheless, under UNCLOS, The Hague arbitration was, strictly
speaking, binding.53 Consequently, while technically enforceable under
UNCLOS Article 29654 and also UNLCOS Article 2 of Annex VII,55 there
46 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 38, ¶¶ 652, 660–61, 666.
47 Id. ¶ 654.
48 Id. ¶ 684.
49 Phillips et al., supra note 5; Donald Rothwell, Cause for optimism in the South China
Sea, EAST ASIA FORUM (July 25, 2016), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2016/07/25/assess
ing-the-damage-the-south-china-sea-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/7J9P-67DK].
50 Sienho Yee, The South China Sea Arbitration (The Philippines v. China): Potential
Jurisdictional Obstacles or Objections, CHINESE J. INT’L L. 663, 664–65 (2014).
51 Id.
52 Rothwell, supra note 49.
53 Tweed, supra note 3.
54 Rothwell, supra note 49.
55 Richard J. Heydarian, The Philippines’ Post-Ruling Options in the South China Sea,
ASIA TIMES (July 16, 2016), http://www.atimes.com/article/the-philippines-post-ruling
-options-in-the-south-china-sea// [https://perma.cc/YPK7-MDVP].
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is no way for any international actor to actually enforce the ruling.56
Despite all of this, under UNCLOS Article 9 of Annex VII, if one of the
parties to the arbitration refuses to be involved, the ultimate decision is
still binding—the arbitration simply goes on with or without that party,57
as “the ‘[a]bsence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall
not constitute a bar to the proceedings.’”58 Thus, even though China chose
not to be involved with the arbitration, the proceedings continued with-
out input from the Chinese government, as is prescribed under UNCLOS.59
Further, under Article 288 of UNCLOS, all disagreements surrounding
jurisdiction must be decided by the tribunal (or court) in question, which
was done in part by the Hague Tribunal in July 2015.60
Turning now to the substance of the proceeding, the Tribunal’s
final decision describes numerous actions on the part of the Chinese
government that have caused continual environmental degradation in
the Sea dating back to 1998.61 Indeed, this destruction was so drastic
that the Philippines argued to the Tribunal that the actions constituted
a breach of “Articles 123, 192, 194, 197, 205, and 206” of UNCLOS.62 Over
the years, Chinese fishermen poached “endangered sea turtles, sharks,
and corals” throughout the Sea,63 as well as endangered giant clams.64
Chinese fishermen also utilized explosives during fishing65 and destroyed
reefs.66 Further, the Chinese government has “under[taken] some con-
struction and land reclamation” on various reefs in the Sea, including
constructing buildings and other structures.67 The island building that
has been undertaken by the Chinese government has also occurred on a
“massive” scale, often involving dredging, which is detrimental to the
marine environment.68 Indeed, according to the Tribunal
56 Tweed, supra note 3.
57 Heydarian, supra note 55.
58 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 28, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3. See also Press Release at 4, South China Sea Arb. (Phil. v. China) (Perm. Ct. Arb.
July 12, 2016), available at https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH
-CN-20160712-Press-Release-No-11-English.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XU6-UCLL].
59 See Press Release, supra note 58, at 4.
60 Id. at 1.
61 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 38, ¶ 827.
62 Id. ¶ 906.
63 Id. ¶ 950.
64 Id.
65 Id. ¶ 845.
66 Id. ¶ 847.
67 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 38, ¶ 853.
68 Id. ¶ 855.
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the conclusions of the Tribunal-appointed independent
experts are unequivocal with respect to the more recent
construction activities, which they say have “impacted
reefs on a scale unprecedented in the region.” They cite a
2016 study analysing satellite imagery that found up to 60
percent of the shallow reef habitat at the seven reefs has
been directly destroyed.69
Ultimately, according to the Tribunal, the Chinese government has caused
significant environmental degradation in the Sea, both by allowing Chi-
nese fisherman to conduct destructive activities on an individual scale,
as well as through state-directed construction efforts.
Additionally, in 2012, the Chinese government (through the
China National Offshore Oil Corporation) “issued a notice of open blocks
for petroleum exploration adjacent to the western edge of the ‘nine-dash
line.’ ”70 However, as was pointed out by the Tribunal in its final decision,
parts of at least one of these blocks are outside of the 200 nautical mile
radius of the features claimed by the Chinese government,71 and features
must be within 200 nautical miles to be within a country’s exclusive
economic zone (discussed further below) under UNCLOS.72 Additionally,
this portion is also outside of the Chinese continental shelf.73 Under
Article 77 of UNCLOS, a coastal state “exercises over the continental
shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its
natural resources,” and these rights are exclusive to the coastal state.74
Therefore, the Tribunal held that, due to the unambiguous nature of the
language of UNCLOS, the right to the resources on the floor of the Sea
belong only to the Philippines (or, alternatively, any other country that
is given express permission by the Philippines).75 Ultimately, however,
the Tribunal held that only one of China’s actions (specifically, where
Chinese ships forced a Philippine boat to stop its activities and leave the
area, despite the fact that they were within the Philippines’ continental
shelf) constituted an actual violation of Article 77 of the Convention.76
69 Id. ¶ 978 (footnotes omitted).
70 Id. ¶ 208.
71 Id.
72 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 58, at art. 57.
73 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 38, ¶ 208.
74 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 58, at art. 77.
75 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 38, ¶ 698.
76 Id. ¶ 708.
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It would appear that China’s protests against Philippine hydro-
carbon exploration77 originate from what China views to be its historic
rights to the Sea.78 Historic rights are defined as “title created in deroga-
tion of international law through historical processes by which one State
has asserted a jurisdiction originally illegal, and this has been acquiesced
in by the community of nations . . . .”79 In line with this, the Tribunal ul-
timately held that in order to assert any sort of historical rights to the
Sea, China would have to demonstrate “that China had historically sought
to prohibit or restrict the exploitation of such resources by the nationals
of other States and that those States had acquiesced in such restric-
tions.”80 The Tribunal ultimately found that there was no such historical
evidence to suggest that this had been the case with the Sea, particularly
with respect to the oil and gas reserves within it.81 This is because, at the
time of the UNCLOS negotiations, the technology related to deep water
oil drilling was still in its beginning phases.82 For these reasons, the
Tribunal found that because the Chinese government had not historically
been engaged in any such activities, China had no historical rights in the
South China Sea.83
Alternatively, the rationale behind China’s claims to the hydro-
carbon reserves of the Sea could also be based on what China claims to
be its exclusive economic zones emanating from “high-tide feature[s]
claimed by China.”84 Under UNCLOS Article 57, exclusive economic
zones do not exceed “200 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.”85 Importantly, under
Article 56(1)(a) of UNCLOS, coastal states have the exclusive sovereign
right to explore and extract both living and non-living natural resources
within their exclusive economic zone.86 This is crucial in that, were China
to have a legitimate exclusive economic zone extending to this portion of
77 Id. ¶ 209.
78 Id. Due to the fact that China was not a party to the dispute it is unclear what they
would have asserted as their grounds for sovereignty had they assented to the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction. Rothwell, supra note 49.
79 JOHN P. GRANT & CRAIG BARKER, PARRY & GRANT ENCYCLOPÆDIC DICTIONARY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 260 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2009) (quoting D.P. O’CONNELL,
INTERNATIONAL LAW 496–97 (1968)).
80 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 38, ¶ 270.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id. ¶¶ 270–71, 692.
84 Id. ¶ 465.
85 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 58, at art. 57.
86 Id. at art. 56(1)(a).
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the Sea, it would be allowed to legitimately “explor[e] and exploit[ ]” the
hydrocarbon reserves in the Sea.87 However, the Tribunal nonetheless
found that the “high-tide feature[s] in the Spratly Islands” that China
had claimed were insufficient to constitute an exclusive economic zone
or continental shelf.88 The Tribunal therefore found contrary to China’s
claims to the right to extract hydrocarbons from specific areas in the
Sea.89 Ultimately, the Tribunal “granted the Philippines sovereign rights
to access offshore oil and gas fields, including the Reed Bank.”90
III. RESOURCE CURSES
In many ways, the hydrocarbon reserves of the South China Sea
constitute a natural resource curse, a scenario in which large quantities
of natural resources lead to (or, alternatively, compound) issues involving
governance.91 Indeed, “as global population and demand grow, the scar-
city of natural resources, especially in oil and water, can be a large factor
in creating conditions ripe for violent conflict.”92 In fact, oil and gas are
two of the natural resources that are most often involved in civil conflict,
along with diamonds (and other precious stones), drugs, and timber.93
While the term “resource curse” is typically utilized to refer to
poor economic growth and development in the context of developing
states,94 the concept can still be extrapolated to the dispute surrounding
the South China Sea. Often the term is used to refer to scenarios in which
an abundance of natural resources has led to governance problems, some-
times termed a “leadership curse,” where leaders are incentivized to ac-
cumulate resource wealth for themselves and not for the benefit of their
people.95 In many ways, this is analogous to the South China Sea conflict,
87 Id.
88 South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 38, ¶ 692.
89 Id. ¶¶ 697–98, 700.
90 Despite Legal Victory in South China Sea, supra note 25.
91 Lesley Wexler, Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the
Blood Diamond Regime, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1717, 1717–18 (2010).
92 Luke A. Whittemore, Intervention and Post-Conflict Natural Resource Governance:
Lessons from Liberia, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 387, 392 (2008).
93 Diane A. Desierto, Leveraging International Economic Tools to Confront Child Soldier-
ing, 43 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 337, 353 (2011); see, e.g., Despite Legal Victory in South
China Sea, supra note 25.
94 Jonathan Bonnitcha, Foreign Investment, Development and Governance, J. INT’L DISP.
SETTLEMENT 31, 37 (2016); see also Whittemore, supra note 92.
95 Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership of Natural Resources
in International Law, 38 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 33, 33–34 (2006).
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as the Chinese government has been effectively incentivized to appropri-
ate as much of the hydrocarbon reserves as possible for the benefit of
their domestic economy before the Philippines is able to do so for itself.
The fact that there is likely so much oil and gas so close to home could
likely serve as an inducement to the Chinese government to take what-
ever measures necessary—such as island building,96 military drills,97 and
aiding Chinese fishermen98—in order to assert its sovereign rights to this
profitable resource.
Here, the valuable nature of the hydrocarbons under the South
China Sea has complicated the dispute over the region even further, in
addition to the concerns about environmental degradation99 and the
security of a monumentally important trade route.100 This is primarily
because the Philippines faces a domestic oil shortage within the coming
decade,101 meaning that the possibility of significant oil reserves so close
to home could potentially be a boon to the Philippine economy. The
Malampaya project, an oilfield “that powers 40% of the main island of
Luzon, home to the capital Manila . . . is approaching the end of its pro-
ductive life,” leaving the hydrocarbons in the South China Sea as a major
possible alternative source of fuel for the country.102
IV. CERTIFICATION SYSTEMS IN GENERAL
Generally speaking, certification schemes for natural resources es-
sentially certify that a good has met predetermined standards of sustain-
ability.103 These schemes often include “(1) establishment of standards;
96 Derek Watkins, What China has Been Building in the South China Sea, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china
-has-been-building-in-the-south-china-sea.html?_r=0 [http://web.archive.org/web/*/https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in
-the-south-china-sea.html?_r=0].
97 Tom Phillips, South China Sea: Beijing begins military drills ahead of key territorial
ruling, THE GUARDIAN (July 5, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/05
/south-china-sea-beijing-begins-military-drills-ahead-of-key-territorial-ruling [https://perma
.cc/3S4C-NATW].
98 Rachael Bale, One of the World’s Biggest Fisheries Is on the Verge of Collapse, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC (Aug. 29, 2016), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/08/wildlife-south
-china-sea-overfishing-threatens-collapse/ [https://perma.cc/RE4R-2PXE].
99 See Northam, supra note 8.
100 See Mathieson, supra note 3; Tweed, supra note 3.
101 Despite Legal Victory in South China Sea, supra note 25.
102 Id.
103 SUSTAINABLE PALM OIL, Certification schemes, http://www.sustainablepalmoil.org/cer
tification-schemes/ [https://perma.cc/3PPS-9XCZ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
370 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 42:357
(2) certification assessment for compliance with the standards; (3) certifi-
cation seal or label; (4) accreditation of the certifier by the certification
body; and (5) compliance monitoring.”104 Further, certification standards
can be internal (i.e., set by the particular company or within the industry
in question) or set externally, by organizations “such as a trade associa-
tion, a supplier, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), a national gov-
ernment, or an international body.”105 These standards can also be
“systems-based” or “performance-based,” the former delineating only the
“management systems” required, and the latter only stating what goals
must be reached, without any requirements as to how this can or should
be done.106 Due to the fact that certification schemes allow for such flexi-
bility in how they are created and enforced, they can easily be adapted
to different goods as well as different markets.107 Certification schemes
also tend to be more efficient than other regulatory means because they
allow consumers to directly target and boycott the offending product
while not affecting other, ethically sourced products.108
The primary benefit associated with certification systems is the
fact that they effectively incentivize the legal extraction of natural re-
sources, in that certification is only given to legally sourced commodi-
ties.109 Therefore, even if the Chinese government were to drill for the
hydrocarbon reserves and resources in the Sea, under a proper certifica-
tion scheme, they would not be able to bring any of the oil or gas for
which they drill to the international market.110 This is significant be-
cause the lack of an available market could effectively de-incentivize the
Chinese government from ever drilling in the first place, thereby pre-
venting any further environmental degradation.111 Or, alternatively, a
certification scheme could curb further drilling after it has begun.112
This approach does not, however, prevent the Chinese government
from bringing this oil and gas to market domestically, and, as a highly pop-
ulated and quickly industrializing country, it is likely that China would
be able to make use of much of this oil and gas in its domestic market.113
104 Pooja Seth Parikh, Harnessing Consumer Power: Using Certification Systems to Pro-
mote Good Governance, 34 ELR 10314, 10315 (2004).
105 Id.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 10314 (explaining the extensive uses for certification schemes).
108 Id. at 10315–16.
109 Id. at 10324.
110 See, e.g., Parikh, supra note 104, at 10324.
111 See id.
112 See id.
113 See GDP (current US$), supra note 26; Population, total, supra note 26.
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Nonetheless, the inability to bring these resources to market in other
countries and to be able to effectively profit off of it internationally could
serve as a sufficient deterrent to the Chinese government, as their capa-
bility to profit off of these oil and gas reserves would necessarily be limited
in scope. Indeed, widespread international condemnation in and of itself,
via the threat alone of a certification scheme, could serve as a carrot that
further incentivizes the Chinese government to abstain from drilling.114
V. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME
The international scheme by which conflict diamonds are regu-
lated, The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (“the Kimberley
Process”), can provide a useful framework by which to establish a regula-
tory mechanism for the hydrocarbon reserves in the South China Sea.
The Kimberley Process was essentially created by the United Nations in
2003115 in order to prevent conflict diamonds from going to the interna-
tional market.116 Conflict, or “blood diamonds,” are defined by the United
Nations as those that “originate from areas controlled by forces or fac-
tions opposed to legitimate and internationally recognized governments,
and are used to fund military action in opposition to those governments,
or in contravention of the decisions of the Security Council.”117 The
Kimberley Process is thus the means by which trade in conflict diamonds
is regulated by nation states, intergovernmental organizations, and pri-
vate entities in an effort to restrict the sale of these resources.118
In a nutshell, the Kimberley Process:
encourages the national regulation of rough diamonds based
on internationally agreed upon minimum standards. All
state participants must ensure that every raw diamond
shipment contains a Kimberley Process certificate and
114 See generally Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century,
35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 11 fn. 30 (2006).
115 David Rhode, The Kimberley Process is a ‘perfect cover story’ for blood diamonds, THE
GUARDIAN (Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/diamonds
-blood-kimberley-process-mines-ethical [https://perma.cc/876T-4AM9].
116 KIMBERLEY PROCESS, What is the Kimberley Process?, https://www.kimberleyprocess
.com [https://perma.cc/VXN4-Y3QN] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
117 Paul Armstrong, What are ‘conflict diamonds?’, CNN (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.cnn
.com/2011/12/05/world/africa/conflict-diamonds-explainer/ [https://perma.cc/2VW2-LP57].
118 Tracey Michelle Price, The Kimberley Process: Conflict Diamonds, WTO Obligations,
and the Universality Debate, 12 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1, 3–4 (2003).
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that no shipment is imported from or exported to a non-
participant. To fulfill these obligations, each participant is
expected to: establish a system of internal controls; utilize
tamper-resistant containers; enact implementing and en-
forcement legislation; and share import and export data.
The Kimberley Process also directs participating states to
self-report on their relevant laws, regulations, and prac-
tices. In addition to its reliance on state participation, this
regulatory institution includes the diamond industry’s
voluntary self-regulation initiatives. These industry efforts
provide for a warranty system, by which members commit
to use an invoice system and “not [to] knowingly buy or
sell or assist others to buy or sell conflict diamonds.”119
Under the Kimberley Process, all of the states and governments
involved consented to internal measures to meet all Kimberley Process
standards, such as taking steps to track diamonds to their place of origin.120
The parties also agreed to prohibit the export of diamonds without a
government certificate, ensuring that the diamonds in question are con-
flict free.121 Under the Kimberley Process, “legally mined diamonds are
those from areas of government control, produced through a chain of
legally authorized transactions, including use of land, permission to
mine, purchase by authorized dealers, and export by licensed exporters.”122
There is even evidence to suggest that these licensing standards have
been effective in increasing the amount of exported diamonds.123
VI. THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS AS A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING
SOUTH CHINA SEA OIL AND GAS RESERVES
As aforementioned, in many ways, the Kimberley Process pres-
ents a promising framework for regulating any possible trade in oil and
gas from the South China Sea, thus effectively de-incentivizing any
drilling on the part of the Chinese government.124 Therefore, even if the
119 Wexler, supra note 91, at 1719–20.
120 Ian Smillie, Blood Diamonds and Non-State Actors, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1003,
1012–13 (2013).
121 Id. at 1013.
122 Parikh, supra note 104, at 10325.
123 Id.
124 See Price, supra note 118, at 1–2; Wexler, supra note 91, at 1719.
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Chinese government does not currently have any concrete plans to drill,
the threat of not being able to find a market for any oil and gas they
would obtain in contravention of the Tribunal’s ruling could be a suffi-
cient deterrent to prevent drilling from ever happening. For these rea-
sons, a cooperative and collaborative effort between countries as well as
the private sector and nongovernmental organizations—through the
means of a certification scheme—is likely the most advantageous mecha-
nism by which to regulate oil and gas extracted from the Sea. Certifica-
tion schemes that involve action on both the public and private sector
level provide the most efficient means of regulation, as “government is
the actor that can provide the coercive authority necessary to resolve
environmental collective action problems.”125 Thus, in order to have the
most effective system possible it is important to include both the public
and private sector, as national governments are able to actually enforce
any standards set, unlike private industry.
If a certification scheme similar to the Kimberley Process were to
be employed with any oil or natural gas sourced from the Sea, both
private entities and governments would necessarily have to collaborate
in a similar way in order to avoid selling these conflict resources. Private
industries would have to agree not to market or refine this oil and gas,
although this would only work if all of the major players agreed, as a
boycott by any one company would then just drive up prices and increase
profits for their competitors.126 Further, governments and other interna-
tional entities would necessarily have to become involved by restricting
the importation of any oil or natural gas that is sold by China and is
certified to have originated from the Sea, effectively cutting off all avail-
able markets for the resources.
Generally speaking, the Kimberley Process can effectively be
utilized as a certification framework for a variety of other natural re-
sources that are involved in some sort of dispute or conflict.127 This model
can be useful in situations in which a single nation state cannot inde-
pendently regulate the activity in question, which, in the context of the
South China Sea, is drilling for oil and gas. The Kimberley Process has
already been successfully utilized as a model for regulating other natural
resources in the European Union and also the Great Lakes region, and
125 Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129,
144 (2013).
126 See BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN NATURE: SCIENCE, MORALITY AND
MODERN LIFE 62 (W. W. Norton & Company, 1986).
127 Wexler, supra note 91, at 1720.
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therefore can also provide a useful framework for regulating oil and gas
from the Sea.128
VII. ACCOUNTING FOR WEAKNESSES WITHIN THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS
One of the most glaring issues as pertains to the effective operation
of certification schemes pertains to gaps in coverage, as, “the experience
with conflict diamonds indicates that such country-specific sanctions
alone may not be sufficiently effective—and that a global certification
system may be needed to effectively curb the trade in conflict resources.”129
Essentially, in order to be most efficacious, it is necessary that certifica-
tion schemes incorporate all major players, here meaning all large oil
and gas importing countries, as well as the large oil and gas refiners and
producers. If one significant oil-consuming country does not enter into
the certification scheme, they will simply enjoy unfettered access to
cheaper oil from China, a benefit not enjoyed by every other country that
does enter into the certification scheme. In many ways, this constitutes
a traditional collective action problem;130 this means that each country is
effectively incentivized not to enter into the certification scheme so that
they can get access to this cheaper source of oil and natural gas.131 The
same is also true for individual oil companies. Ultimately, a certification
scheme like the Kimberley Process will only work if all major players
agree to enter into the agreement (and, as discussed later, there is a
legitimate enforcement mechanism). This universal agreement can be
difficult to obtain, particularly when governments with vastly different
domestic economies, values, and needs are involved, but it is not impossi-
ble. Such a far reaching agreement is not, by any means, unheard of in
international law, as is exemplified by the Kimberley Process itself,132 as
well as the WTO,133 and the United Nations.134 For these reasons, it is
128 See id. at 1720–21.
129 Parikh, supra note 104, at 10322.
130 Katharina Holzinger, The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach at 2 (2003),
https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2003_02online.pdf [https://perma.cc/DF7Y-R2BQ].
131 See generally Yvonne Rydin & Mark Pennington, Public Participation and Local Envi-
ronmental Planning: the collective action problem and the potential of social capital, 5
LOC. ENV’T 153, 158 (2000) (explaining that collective action is a common problem in
“environmental planning”).
132 KIMBERLEY PROCESS, List of Participants—status 2017, https://www.kimberleyprocess
.com/en/2016-kp-participants-list [https://perma.cc/W35C-DDT5] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
133 WTO, Members and Observers of the WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/coun
tries_e/org6_map_e.htm [https://perma.cc/V5EV-C763] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
134 U.N., Member States, http://www.un.org/en/member-states/ [https://perma.cc/F4AS
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important to craft an agreement that involves and is palatable to all
major players in both the public and private sectors. This can certainly
be achieved through extensive and inclusive negotiations.
Further, when there is no real means of enforcing compliance
with certification schemes, this leads to the exact problem facing the
Philippines in light of the recent Hague Tribunal decision: what if one
party simply chooses not to comply?135 Often, one of the main issues that
arises with international law is enforcement,136 as is evidenced by the
unenforceability of the Hague Tribunal decision itself.137 Countries may
be loathe to surrender any of their sovereignty by acquiescing to de-
mands by Intergovernmental Organizations (“IGOs”), often for domestic
political reasons.138 Certification schemes essentially incentivize compli-
ance through the threat of consumer backlash and boycotts (along with
the accompanying “carrots” of being able to charge higher prices and
gaining market access), but companies, and in this case, governments,
may simply choose not to abide by a voluntary certification scheme.139
Nonetheless, even a voluntary, non-binding agreement can still
be effective in deterring trade in conflict resources. One of the strengths
of the Kimberley Process is that it requires countries “to enact the requi-
site legislation and import controls to support such national systems.”140
It is crucial that the Kimberley Process provides some leeway for the
countries involved, as this flexibility makes it significantly more likely
that countries will voluntarily assent to the scheme in the first place.
Countries are often hesitant to take part in treaties and other interna-
tional agreements that could in any way limit their sovereignty—or could
at least have that appearance domestically—and, therefore, allowing for
some domestic adaptability, would likely make such an agreement all the
more palatable to individual states.141 By providing minimum standards
135 See Parikh, supra note 104, at 10316.
136 Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. (Jan. 22, 1996),
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-international-law [https://perma
.cc/7RUZ-8WGA].
137 See, e.g., South China Sea Arbitration Award, supra note 38.
138 See generally Oona Hathaway, International Delegation and Domestic Sovereignty,
YALE L. SCH. LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 115, 115 (2007), http://digitalcommons.law
.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1858&context=fss_papers [https://web.archive.org
/web/*/http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1858&context=fss
_papers].
139 Parikh, supra note 104, at 10316.
140 Id. at 10321.
141 See generally Hathaway, supra note 138, at 128–32.
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and then allowing countries to enforce these by the means of their choos-
ing, an oil and gas certification scheme would be much more likely to
gain widespread assent in the first place, as well as compliance once
instituted. Essentially, if the individual states themselves are choosing
the means of compliance that are best for them, they will be significantly
more likely to abide by these standards, particularly compared to a system
imposed by outsiders without intimate knowledge of each country’s indi-
vidual domestic economy. Thus, by systematically incorporating flexibil-
ity at the national level, a voluntary certification scheme could avoid many
of the enforcement problems that are inherent when dealing with inter-
national actors.142 Indeed, all WTO countries have already agreed to
minimum standards in treaties that cover a variety of industries anyway,
such as The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (“TRIPS”).143 Another example of a treaty that incorporates
minimum standards and flexibility on the national level, and yet still has
almost universal membership,144 is the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (“CITES”).145
Another alternative solution for the certification scheme enforce-
ment problem would be to make compliance binding and non-voluntary,
although this is much more difficult to achieve in the international setting
with diverse countries with diverse motivations.146 Binding international
agreements do nonetheless exist, such as the World Trade Organization
(“WTO”) Dispute Resolution Understanding,147 although the Kimberley
Process is itself non-binding.148 Perhaps one of the advantages of a bind-
ing certification scheme in the context of the South China Sea is that it
142 See generally Oona Hathaway & Scott Shapiro, Outcasting: Enforcement in Domestic
and International Law, 121 YALE L.J. 252, 255–56 (2011).
143 WTO, Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e
/intel2_e.htm [https://perma.cc/WBE7-75W2] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
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perma.cc/8HZ4-WNRZ] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
145 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
146 See generally Why is a global agreement so difficult to achieve?, MEI, http://www.iedm
.org/56529-why-is-a-global-agreement-so-difficult-to-achieve [https://perma.cc/YN2X-25G4]
(last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
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[https://perma.cc/ET4F-JBW6] (last visited Nov. 12, 2017).
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would be so narrowly tailored that it would not affect the average con-
sumer directly and thus would not be as controversial for countries to
join in the first place. This is because the average consumer will likely not
feel as though an embargo on oil and natural gas from the South China
Sea directly affects them (although world oil supply does, in fact, directly
affect us all to some degree). For these reasons, there is less cause to be-
lieve that there would be domestic resistance which could give national
governments pause when entering into such a binding international
agreement, although all of these factors remain true with a voluntary
scheme as well. Further, it is also much less likely that the average
citizen would feel that such an embargo presents an existential threat to
national sovereignty in the same way that, for example, Americans might
react to a gun control measure put forth by the United Nations. In many
ways, this issue would probably be less inflammatory to domestic audi-
ences because it is a more indirect economic issue. Consequently, while
it would likely be quite difficult to obtain widespread assent to a binding
international agreement, it can be done, and certainly has been done in
the past. The fact that this is a relatively non-controversial issue domes-
tically for many countries would likely make passage of such an agree-
ment significantly easier.
Another major issue with the Kimberley Process is that it does
not regulate each step of the supply chain, in that it “does not require
participants to regulate the flow of diamonds from the mine or field to
the point of first export.”149 This lack of licensing for mines thus opens
the door for conflict diamonds to enter the market, effectively bypassing
certification.150 Indeed, the United States—which “consumes more than
one-half of the world’s diamonds”—only requires certification from the
country that exports to the United States, and not the country of origin.151
This leads to the obvious problem that conflict diamonds can avoid regu-
lation through the Kimberley Process if they are simply routed to a third
country before being exported to the United States.152 This issue could be
addressed in the context of oil and gas from the South China Sea simply
by requiring certification from the country of origin in addition to the
country of export, effectively imposing regulation in each link of the supply
chain. As aforementioned, significant incentives (access to cheaper oil,
essentially) exist to circumvent the rules of such a certification scheme,
149 Parikh, supra note 104, at 10321.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 10320.
152 Id. at 10321.
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so it is necessary to include proper safeguards to ensure that the system
is not abused, i.e., through corruption.
Additionally, under the Kimberley Process, the chain of custody
of the diamonds in question is monitored only on a voluntary basis once
the diamonds reach the country to which they are exported, meaning that
conflict diamonds could penetrate the market at this point.153 The so-
lution to this problem, in terms of oil and gas, is, again, to require man-
datory monitoring of the chain of custody at each step, ensuring that any
oil and gas that is extracted from the South China Sea by China cannot
enter the market. As discussed previously, the certification scheme in
question, if voluntary, could set minimum standards and allow each state
to decide on an individual level how they intend to enforce these stan-
dards, allowing for domestic flexibility.
Nonetheless, this gap in coverage as pertains to the chain of
custody presents a more practical problem in the regulation of oil and gas
from the South China Sea; unlike diamonds, which are only mined en
mass from a few specific regions in the world,154 oil and gas are more
plentiful worldwide.155 Thus, it would be inherently more difficult to
enact a licensing scheme that would cover every region and country that
drills for oil and gas. For these reasons, when the goods at issue are of a
nature such that it is impossible for the consumer to easily tell whether
or not the commodity was legally sourced (as is the case with oil and gas),
the certification system involved must be rigorous and must require
certification at each step in the supply chain.156 Often, the difference
between certified and non-certified products is communicated to consum-
ers via labeling, however this is practically nonfeasible as relates to oil
and gas.157 While the containers in which the commodities are shipped
can be labeled, it is impossible to communicate to the everyday user at
the gas pump that his or her gas was legally sourced and certified. For
these reasons, it is even more important to require stringent regulation
at each point in the supply chain, which can certainly be achieved by
setting minimum standards for all parties to the scheme.
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Further, certifications schemes are significantly easier to implement
in a single country, with a single, discrete resource, and with a centralized
national government.158 It could be practically difficult to impose such
stringent restrictions globally through a certification system that is not
binding, as some countries may not appreciate such an intrusion into their
sovereignty, as discussed previously.159 Nonetheless, as aforementioned,
one requirement of the certification scheme for conflict oil and gas could
be that each nation must utilize a licensing standard that must incorporate
certain criterion, but that leaves much of the regulation up to the individ-
ual state. This flexibility on the national level, as discussed previously,
could be crucial to addressing the issue of regulation of such diffuse parties.
Another negative aspect of the Kimberley Process is that it can,
in some ways, incentivize corruption, in that the certificates that are nec-
essary for export could be forged or acquired by bribery relatively easily.160
There are ways to address these concerns however; case in point, in Sierra
Leone, confiscated conflict diamonds are auctioned off by the government,
and forty percent of the total sale is given to the person “responsible for
confiscation.”161 In fact, this scheme has actually led to higher profits in
diamond rich countries, such as Sierra Leone.162 This system effectively
incentivizes government officials to report corruption and avoid engaging
in such behaviors themselves.163 These types of solutions are more aptly
applied on the individual country level, however, rather than to the larger
international system. Nonetheless, in order to extrapolate these mea-
sures out to the international system, such safeguards against corruption
could be incorporated into the minimum standards that each country in
the certification scheme must adopt.164 Additionally, countermeasures (in
the form of additional duties, and the like) could be levied against coun-
tries where significant corruption is found, thereby incentivizing national
governments to keep their own houses in order. However, any counter-
measures that constitute barriers to trade imposed against other coun-
tries bear the risk of running afoul of WTO obligations.165 Therefore, if
158 EDWARD BARBIER ET AL., THE ECONOMICS OF THE TROPICAL TIMBER TRADE 153 (Earth-
scan Publications Limited 1994).
159 See Hathaway, supra note 138, at 127.
160 Parikh, supra note 104, at 10325.
161 Id. at 10333.
162 MATS BERDAL & ACHIM WENNMANN, ENDING WARS, CONSOLIDATING PEACE: ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVES 130 (Mats Berdal, Achim Wennmann eds., 2012).
163 Parikh, supra note 104, at 10333.
164 Id.
165 For example, it is a violation of the most favoured nation principle to “discriminate
between . . . trading partners,” and levying countermeasures against a specific noncompliant
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countermeasures are adopted, they would have to be carefully crafted such
that they do not implicate any WTO obligations.166
Generally speaking, another major hurdle to the implementation
of a scheme like the Kimberley Process is that it runs the possibility of
infringing upon WTO obligations (including, but not limited to, national
treatment and most favored nation status).167 This is particularly impor-
tant given the fact that most of the countries in the world—164—are
WTO members,168 and thus have WTO obligations. Therefore, if the certi-
fication scheme created is voluntary, it is less likely to raise any concerns
under the WTO, whereas one that involves binding actions by a national
government will have to tread more carefully.169 However, states that
take part in the Kimberley Process have been granted a waiver of certain
obligations by the WTO General Council,170 and it is therefore feasible
that the General Council would be willing to extend such exceptions for
a certification scheme for oil and gas from the South China Sea, although
this would have to be negotiated in depth before any such scheme could
be implemented. Nonetheless, the possibility still exists that an excep-
tion could be made for such a certification scheme.
The Kimberley Process also does not have any requirements for
“independent third-party monitoring,”171 which would be a useful over-
sight mechanism in ensuring that oil and gas from the Sea are not brought
into countries through illicit means (i.e., breaks in a supervised supply
chain). In implementing a certification system, it is imperative to have
concrete, clearly established standards; therefore, including provisions
for independent monitoring is crucial in enforcing compliance.172 By not
including any form of external reporting system, individual states and
private actors are effectively incentivized to bring oil and gas from the Sea
via more circuitous means in order to circumvent regulation. For these
reasons, incorporating some sort of mandatory third-party reporting system
would ensure that individual actors are meeting their minimum obliga-
tions under the scheme. However, if this external monitoring system only
country could certainly violate this. WTO, Principles of the trading system, https://www
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relies on self-reporting from each state, it would be difficult to ensure
accuracy, as states could easily manipulate their reports without the
third party’s knowledge. Therefore, it might be necessary to also incor-
porate some system of checks on individual countries’ reporting schemes,
such as third-party inspections, in order to ensure compliance.
The Kimberley Process also has “weak provisions for monitoring
and enforcement,” in general, an issue that necessarily would have to be
addressed as pertains to any potential certification scheme, particularly
in light of the fact that this conflict came into being because of China’s
noncompliance with international law.173 One of the main drawbacks of
the Kimberley Process is that it cannot impose any sanctions or counter-
measures against non-compliant states, with the exception of expulsion
from membership (although this is certainly counterproductive to the
mission of the Kimberley Process in the first place, and is thus not particu-
larly effective as a remedy).174 Monitoring could be achieved, as afore-
mentioned, by incorporating independent, third-party review, yet these
evaluations would ultimately mean nothing if there is no real means of en-
forcement. Submission to binding arbitration in international tribunals
is frequently utilized in the context of enforcing international agreements,
and could be a potential remedy here.175 Nonetheless, parties may be more
hesitant to sign on to an agreement that includes a binding arbitration
clause, or may attempt to circumvent these clauses through the means
of reservations, much as China did with UNCLOS.176 Many treaties, how-
ever, rely simply on a “naming and shaming” of noncompliant parties in
the hope that the reputational harms of evading one’s international obli-
gations will be enough bring errant parties in line.177 In the context of
international law, reputation, particularly for compliance with interna-
tional obligations, can often be a successful enforcement mechanism.178
Certification schemes in general center around providing consumers
with enough information to make an informed decision as to which prod-
ucts they purchase,179 which is, in many ways, a weakness as pertains to
173 See id. at 10322. See also Desierto, supra note 93, at 365.
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oil and gas certification. This system works best for well-known conflict
resources such as blood diamonds; the conflict over the South China Sea
is probably not as well known to the average consumer, and the dispute
is more complex than that surrounding blood diamonds.180 Further, oil
and gas goes through a much different consumption process than dia-
monds, as individuals do not purchase oil and gas simply for the sake of
owning it, as they do with diamonds. Oil and gas are, in many ways,
more of a tool than a consumer good, unlike diamonds. Thus, a certifica-
tion scheme may not be as effective as consumers may not know or care
about the South China Sea dispute as much as they might care about
ethical sourcing for other goods.181 For example, the average consumer
is much more likely to have heard about blood diamonds, or garments
and electronics that are manufactured under poor work safety standards,
as these issues often make the news (for example, the Bangladesh factory
collapse and the controversy surrounding the FoxConn plant in China).182
The South China Sea dispute, however, is not as widely covered in the
media and also does not have as much of a direct effect on consumers
outside of Asia, thus lowering the efficacy of a certification scheme that
relies on consumer choices.183 Additionally, diamond extraction primarily
affects the producing country, whereas oil extraction has a greater effect
on the end user, in that economies are dependent upon oil and gas im-
portation184 to a much greater extent than luxury goods like diamonds.
Therefore, due to the fact that oil and gas are much more necessary to
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the average consumer than diamonds, consumers may not be as inclined
to boycott such an essential item. However, if countries are regulating
this oil and gas at the point of importation, such that the choice never even
reaches the consumer, the point is moot. Further, a certification scheme
that regulates oil and gas on the national level would likely be palatable
to many national governments as a less aggressive means by which to
demonstrate to China other countries’ unwillingness to allow China to
assert its sovereignty however it chooses. Therefore, the fact that the
conflict over the South China Sea is perhaps not terribly relevant to the
average consumer will likely not be a bar to an effective enforcement
mechanism. This is due to the fact that many countries would likely agree
to such measures as they are effective, yet still less aggressive than other
mechanisms, such as economic sanctions or the use of force.
CONCLUSION
As was made clear by the Hague Tribunal’s decision, something
must be done to curb environmental degradation in the South China Sea,
and prevent this destruction from continuing. Ultimately, while the Tribu-
nal’s decision was certainly helpful to the Philippines’ case regarding the
prevention of further environmental degradation in the Sea, it still lacks
any effective enforcement mechanism. It is for this reason that it is
crucial to explore alternative means by which to prevent further environ-
mental destruction in the Sea, in particular, one aimed at preventing and
de-incentivizing the Chinese government from drilling for oil and gas.
Through the utilization of a certification scheme, much like the
Kimberley Process, any oil or gas that is extracted by the Chinese gov-
ernment from the South China Sea can be prevented from going to the
international marketplace, thus effectively making drilling that much
less profitable for the Chinese government. This mechanism would, in
effect, both de-incentivize China from exploration and drilling and, in
case the Chinese government proceeds anyway, would automatically
restrict the profit making capabilities of any oil and gas China extracts
from the Sea. When creating such a certification scheme it will be of the
utmost importance to account for the inherent weaknesses in the Kimberley
Process, and to also make modifications to the process to make it more
applicable to such an inherently different resource. Ultimately, through
the creation of a certification or by some other means, it is of the utmost
importance to prevent further environmental degradation in the South
China Sea given its ecological importance worldwide.
